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Over the last twenty years, international and regional conventions have been concluded to 
combat the corruption of public officials. Part I of the paper explains the genesis of international 
anti-corruption law and its focus on the “supply-side” of bribery transactions, drawing on 
the negotiating history and the experience of practitioners involved in the development of 
international anti-corruption law. Parts II and III examine Canada’s implementation of its 
international obligations and its enforcement record to date. Part IV of the paper concludes 
with an analysis of the challenges faced by Canadian businesses and the limitations of the 
focus on supply-side of bribery transactions.
Depuis une vingtaine d’années, des conventions internationales et régionales ont été 
conclues afin de lutter contre la corruption d’agents publics. S’inspirant de l’historique 
des négociations et de l’expérience des spécialistes qui les ont mises au point, la première 
partie de l’article traite de la genèse des lois internationales de lutte contre la corruption 
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et du fait qu’elles ciblent le « côté de l’offre » des transactions entachées de corruption. La 
seconde et la troisième parties examinent la mise en œuvre par le Canada de ses obligations 
internationales et l’historique de leur application à ce jour. En conclusion, la quatrième partie 
de l’article analyse les défis auxquels doivent faire face les entreprises canadiennes et les 
limitations du ciblage du « côté de l’offre » des transactions entachées de corruption.
IN 1997, CANADA AND THE TWENTY-EIGHT OTHER Members of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), along with five 
additional countries, signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions.1 The signature and ratification of 
this convention marked an important milestone in a campaign against corruption 
that had been picking up momentum through the early 1990s. 
The principal thrust of the campaign was to tackle supply-side corruption—
that is, to counter corruption by cutting off the supply of bribe payments. 
1. 17 December 1997, 37 ILM 1 (entered into force 15 February 1999) [OECD Convention].
I. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL RULES ................................................................................... 234
A. The Focus on Supply-Side Corruption (Bribe Payers) ....................................................... 234
1. Genesis of the International Anti-Corruption Consensus .................................. 235
B. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention ................................................................................... 241
1. Developing a Binding Convention ........................................................................ 241
2. Focus on the Supply Side of Bribery Transactions ............................................. 242
3. Content and Scope of the OECD Convention ....................................................... 242
4. Implementation, Compliance, and Peer Review ................................................. 243
II. CANADA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS .......................................... 246
C. The CFPOA .......................................................................................................................... 246
1. Elements of the Offence ...................................................................................... 247
2. Facilitation Payments .......................................................................................... 248
D. June 2013 Amendments to the CFPOA .............................................................................. 249
3. Nationality-Based Jurisdiction ............................................................................ 249
4. Definition of Business .......................................................................................... 250
5. Elimination of Facilitation Payments Exception .................................................. 251
6. Books and Records Offence ................................................................................ 252
E. Debarment and Non-Criminal Law Mechanism ................................................................ 252
III. CANADA’S ENFORCEMENT RECORD TO DATE ................................................................................ 254
A. The Early Years: Hydro-Kleen ............................................................................................ 256
B. The Second Wave: Investigations and Prosecutions in the Public Eye .............................. 257
C. Testing the CFPOA: Karigar and Pending SNC-Lavalin Cases ............................................ 259
1. R v Karigar—Trial and Sentencing Decisions ...................................................... 260
2. SNC-Lavalin: Investigations and First Charges ................................................... 261
IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCERNS ........................................................................................... 263
D. The Challenge for Canadian Business ............................................................................... 263
E. Limitations of the OECD Convention Approach and Future Directions ............................. 264
BARUTCISKI, BANDALI, CORRUPTION AT THE INTERSECTION OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 233
Although all countries prohibit bribery of their own officials, prior to the entry 
into force of the OECD Convention on 15 February 1999, the United States was 
the only country in the world that expressly prohibited the payment of bribes to 
foreign officials, as a result of the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act2 
(“FCPA”) in 1977.
Since the development of the international consensus on addressing the supply 
side of bribery transactions, several trends have driven multinational enterprises 
to focus on anti-corruption compliance. The increase in corporate focus on 
these issues has in turn encouraged the emergence of specialized anti-corruption 
compliance professionals, investigators, lawyers, and other advisors. While the 
focus on the supply side has produced significant improvements in training, internal 
controls, and corporate compliance generally, it has also created significant direct 
and indirect costs for companies,3 which can quickly become difficult to control 
or make proportional to the corruption risk at issue. In addition, even the most 
robust compliance regimes can be circumvented if the incentives are high enough 
and circumventers devote sufficient effort. So long as the efforts to constrain 
supply-side corruption are not matched by equivalent efforts on the demand side, 
there will be inefficiencies and misallocation of resources both in compliance 
activities and in the broader international campaign against corruption.
This article aims to explain the development and limits of the focus on 
supply-side corruption from the perspective of a practitioner who participated 
in the genesis and implementation of the supply-side approach. Part I explains 
the origins of the international focus on the supply side of bribery transactions—
memorialized in the OECD Convention—based on process documents and 
the experience of practitioners involved in the development of this approach. 
Notwithstanding the broader scope of subsequent anti-corruption conventions, 
such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption4 (“UNCAC”), 
combating supply-side corruption remains the dominant focus of Canada’s 
2. 15 USC tit 15 § 78m (1977) [FCPA].
3. Corporate anti-corruption compliance entails substantial direct and indirect costs at both 
the operational day-to-day level and in the transactional deal context (i.e., mergers and 
acquisitions, joint ventures, borrowing and financing, et cetera). Direct costs include the 
administrative costs of maintaining compliance staff, training, monitoring and audit, 
third-party due diligence, counsel and forensic investigation fees, and other costs related 
to the ongoing implementation of compliance procedures. There are also substantial 
indirect costs that come into play in the context of impacts on commercial negotiations, 
diversion and distraction of management resources, and the costs of delay in implementing 
transactions resulting from due diligence and other compliance-related activities.
4. 31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41 (entered into force 14 December 2005) [UNCAC].
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implementation of its international anti-corruption obligations. Accordingly, 
Parts II and III presents an overview of Canada’s record to date in implementing 
those obligations, including the adoption of the Corruption of Foreign Public 
Officials Act5 (“CFPOA”), legislative changes to the CFPOA in 2013, and the 
evolution of Canadian law enforcement efforts. Part IV presents some reflections 
on the limits of the OECD Convention’s current approach and suggestions for 
future directions.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL RULES
A. THE FOCUS ON SUPPLY-SIDE CORRUPTION (BRIBE PAYERS)
Over the last twenty years, several international and regional conventions have 
been concluded to combat official corruption. These include the Inter-American 
Convention against Corruption6 in 1996, the OECD Convention7 in 1997, the 
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption8 in 1999, the African 
Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption9 in 2009, and the 
UNCAC10 in 2003. Of these, the instrument that has had the greatest impact on 
international business is the OECD Convention. 
Before the OECD Convention, bribing a foreign public official was not only 
tolerated but was legally permissible everywhere except in the United States. In 
fact, in Canada and many other jurisdictions, the cost of paying a bribe was a 
deductible business expense for income tax purposes.11 This practice only changed 
in 1996 as a result of an OECD Recommendation calling for the elimination 
of tax deductibility for bribes.12 This Recommendation was a precursor of the 
OECD Convention. In fact, the preferential tax treatment of bribes continued to 
be an issue after the adoption of the OECD Convention.13
5. SC 1998, c 34 [CFPOA].
6. 29 March 1996, OASTS No B-58 (entered into force 6 March 1997).
7. OECD Convention, supra note 1.
8. 27 January 1999, Eur TS No 173 (entered into force 1 July 2002).
9. 11 July 2003, 43 ILM 5 (entered into force 5 August 2006).
10. UNCAC, supra note 4.
11. See Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) s 67.5. This section now prohibits deducting 
expenses incurred for the purpose of doing anything that would be an offence under s 3 of 
the CFPOA or the domestic bribery provisions of the Criminal Code. See CFPOA, supra note 
5, s 3. See also Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 121-23, 426.
12. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public 
Officials, 35 ILM 1311 (11 April 1996).
13. US, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Battling International Bribery (Washington: 
US Department of State, 1999) at 33 [Battling International Bribery].
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There are several reasons for the historical tolerance of foreign bribery. 
The first is the predominantly territorial basis of criminal law.14 When a company 
pays a bribe to a foreign official in a host country, the actus reus of the bribery 
offence often occurs entirely in the host country and outside of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the company’s home country laws. Accordingly, absent rules 
conferring nationality-based or some other form of extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
the company’s home country cannot assert adjudicative jurisdiction over the 
offence. Second, the principles of international comity and sovereign equality 
make it improper—or at the very least, difficult—for one country to dictate 
norms of conduct for officials of another sovereign country in the foreign 
sovereign’s territory. Third, both companies and governments have historically 
followed a pragmatic and relativistic approach to transactions and commercial 
operations in multiple jurisdictions: when in Rome, do as the Romans do.
As the scope and volume of international business has expanded, all three of 
these rationales for tolerating foreign corruption have increasingly come under 
criticism. International and domestic laws, standards, and commercial norms 
have developed that depart from these three principles. Nonetheless, in the years 
leading up to the OECD Convention, the principles of territoriality, comity, and 
sovereign equality, along with pragmatic relativism, made the emergence of an 
international consensus on anti-corruption far from inevitable.
1. GENESIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION CONSENSUS
The international consensus to tackle corruption through coordinated international 
efforts was the result of two parallel movements during the early 1990s. The first 
came from non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), notably Transparency 
International (“TI”), who were motivated by the frustration of seeing billions 
of dollars in development aid being misappropriated by corrupt officials and 
siphoned into offshore accounts. The second—perhaps surprisingly to some—
came from the US business community, which felt that it was at a competitive 
disadvantage in international business due to the fact that its foreign competitors 
did not face a legal burden equivalent to the US FCPA.
I. ANTI-CORRUPTION AND THE NGO COMMUNITY
In the 1990s, individuals and organizations involved in international development 
began to identify and publicize the harmful effects of bribery and corruption. 
The most prominent NGO to engage on the issue of corruption was TI, which 
14. See Libman v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 178 at 183-84, 21 DLR (4th) 174 [Libman].
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was founded in 1993 as a coalition of civil society and business that aimed to 
create a global anti-corruption movement. Industry-specific organizations also 
began to take action against corruption. For example, in 1995, the International 
Federation of Consulting Engineers began to include anti-corruption language in 
its model contracts, and in 1996, both the International Chamber of Commerce 
(“ICC”) and the American Bar Association (“ABA”) published recommendations 
encouraging their members to support anti-corruption activity.15
Around this same time, international development organizations and think 
tanks, such as the UK’s Overseas Development Institute (“ODI”), observed greater 
attention to and discussion of the possibility of tying aid funding to political 
reform in developing countries, known as “political conditionality.”16 The ODI 
noted that, among other things, “[the] current donor interest in questions of 
governance and democracy [and] … [t]he motivation for political and institutional 
reform stems from a desire to improve aid effectiveness, by preventing waste and 
corruption and strengthening the overall policy environment.”17 
International organizations and international financial institutions also 
played a key role in providing a platform to identify the problem corruption 
posed to the effective use of development aid. For example, at its 1992 High Level 
Meeting, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (“DAC”)—made 
up of the representatives of the major foreign aid donor countries—addressed 
what OECD Development Co-operation Directorate Director Helmut 
Führer18 called “one of the last taboo subjects,”19 namely corruption. The DAC 
highlighted the detrimental impacts of corruption on development, observing 
that “corruption can result in the misuse of aid as well as domestic resources 
and can damage the reputation of aid efforts in donor countries.”20 In 1996, 
the DAC formally recommended that Members introduce anti-corruption 
provisions for procurement that is funded by bilateral aid, in keeping with the 
15. Carolyn Hotchkiss, “The Sleeping Dog Stirs: New Signs of Life in Efforts to End Corruption 
in International Business” (1998) 17:1 J Pub Pol’y & Marketing 108 at 112.
16. Overseas Development Institute, “Aid and Political Reform,” Briefing Paper (January 
1992) at 2, online: <www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/6774.pdf>.
17. Ibid. 
18. Führer was the Director of the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate 
from 1975 to 1993.
19. The Story of Official Development Assistance: A History of the Development Assistance  
Committee and the Development Co-operation Directorate in Dates, Names and Figures  
(Paris: OECD, 1994) at 60. 
20. Ibid at 61. 
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rationale that corruption wastes the scarce resources available for development.21 
The DAC Recommendation was one of the precursors to the 1997 OECD 
Revised Recommendation22 and the subsequent OECD Convention.23
The anti-corruption campaigners of the 1990s felt that there was little 
prospect of disciplining governments for condoning corruption by their own 
officials. However, they believed that corruption could be curbed by imposing 
harsh penalties on the bribe payers (hence the term “supply side”). This belief was 
the motivation behind the OECD’s anti-corruption work in the 1990s.
II. ANTI-CORRUPTION AND THE US BUSINESS COMMUNITY
By the early 1990s, the US business community had become an important 
proponent of international anti-corruption efforts. Since 1977, US-domiciled 
companies had been subject to domestic federal anti-corruption legislation in 
the form of the FCPA. While competitors from other countries were free to bribe 
with impunity, US companies had the burden of complying with the FCPA, 
which prohibited making payments to foreign government officials in order to 
obtain or retain business. 
Soon after the United States enacted the FCPA, the American business 
community argued that the Act disadvantaged American companies relative to 
foreign competitors.24 Within the first few years of the FCPA’s operation, the US 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) conducted a survey of a sample of the 
largest US firms and found that over 60 per cent of respondents felt that, all other 
conditions being equal, American companies could not compete internationally 
21. OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Recommendation on Anti-Corruption 
Proposals for Aid-Funded Procurement: Follow-up report, (May 1997), online: <www.
oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/recommendationonanti-corruptionproposalsforaid-
fundedprocurementfollow-upreport.htm>.
22. OECD, Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business 
Transactions, 36 ILM 1016 (23 May 1997) [1997 Revised Recommendation]. 
23. Supra note 1. 
24. See e.g. US, Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy and Subcommittee 
on Securities on the Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on US Business, 97th Cong 
(Washington: United States General Accounting Office, 1981) (Donald L Scantlebury) 
[Scantlebury Statement]. Donald L Scantlebury was the Chief Accountant of the General 
Accounting Office and Division Director of the Accounting and Financial Management 
Division. See also US, Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Finance and 
Monetary Policy and the Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 
1983) at 68, 78.
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against foreign competitors able to pay bribes.25 Over 50 per cent of respondents 
believed that an international anti-bribery treaty would strengthen the United 
States’s competitive position.26 The GAO accordingly argued that Congress 
should urge the President to actively pursue an international agreement.27
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the US business community and a variety 
of US government actors advocated for an international treaty to address the 
problem of corruption and ameliorate the disadvantages created by the FCPA. 
Industry organizations such as the US Chamber of Commerce strongly supported 
FCPA reform efforts to mitigate the unintended detrimental impacts of the FCPA 
on business. Proposed bills, such as the 1983 Business Accounting and Foreign Trade 
Simplification Act, not only included clarifications of US domestic legislation 
but also called on the President to pursue negotiations towards an international 
agreement on illicit payments and to report any progress to Congress.28 However, 
it was not until the Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 that 
the FCPA was successfully amended.29 Among other things, the 1988 Act required 
the President to negotiate an agreement with the OECD to internationalize the 
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.30 
The concern that the FCPA disadvantaged the United States against its 
economic competitors appears to explain why decision makers chose to act 
specifically at the OECD. An international agreement among this organization’s 
members—most of the world’s largest economies, accounting for the 
overwhelming majority of exports and foreign direct investment—would bind 
the US business community’s major competitors, thereby levelling the economic 
playing field for American companies.31 
25. Scantlebury Statement, supra note 24 at 14.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid at 15. 
28. US, Bill S 414, 98th Cong, 1983.
29. Pub L 100-418, 102 Stat 1107.
30. Ellen Gutterman, “Easier Done than Said: Transnational Bribery, Norm Resonance, 
and the Origins of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (2015) 11:1 Foreign Pol’y 
Analysis 109 at 117. 
31. See William J Clinton, “Statement by the President” (10 November 1998), online: The 
United States Department of Justice <www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/
legacy/2012/11/14/signing.pdf> (statement delivered at the signing of the International 
Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998 at The White House). See also The United 
States Department of Justice, “Proposed Legislative History: International Anti-Bribery Act 
of 1998” (14 November 2012), online: <www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/
legacy/2012/11/14/leghistory.pdf>.
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III.  ANTI-CORRUPTION AT THE OECD
Following these developments at home, US officials at the OECD began in 1989 to 
advocate for other OECD Members to criminalize the bribery of foreign officials 
in commercial transactions.32 This is not to say that bribery was previously absent 
from the policy work of the OECD; for example, the 1976 OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises33 included a specific anti-bribery provision.34 However, 
guidelines for the conduct of multinational enterprises could hardly satisfy the 
wishes of the US business community that OECD Member countries introduce 
FCPA-like legislation domestically to criminalize the offer or payment of bribes 
to foreign officials.
As with previous efforts to develop an international agreement on illicit 
payments, the United States’s efforts were met with opposition. Prominent 
OECD Members, such as Germany, France, Japan, and Spain, initially opposed 
the initiative.35 Specifically, France and Germany objected to the extraterritorial 
effect of the proposed bribery offence. Germany also raised concerns regarding 
the difficulty of detecting and proving the existence of bribery.36 However, by 
1994, their opposition abated, and the OECD adopted a formal anti-corruption 
Recommendation.37 In addition to calling on member states to take effective 
measures to deter, prevent, and combat the bribery of foreign public officials, 
the 1994 Recommendation required the Committee on International Investment 
32. Mark Pieth, “International Cooperation to Combat Corruption” in Kimberly Ann Elliott, 
ed, Corruption and the Global Economy (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 
1997) 119 at 122-23 [Pieth, “International Cooperation to Combat Corruption”]. See 
also US, House Commerce Committee, 105th Cong, International Anti-Bribery and Fair 
Competition Act of 1998 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1998) at 10.
33. OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, National Treatment, International Investment 
Incentives and Disincentives, Consultation Procedures (Paris: OECD, 1976), online: <www.
oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/50024800.pdf>. The Guidelines were annexed to the 1976 Declaration 
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. See OECD, Declaration on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 15 ILM 967 (21 June 1976).
34. Ibid at 972. In particular, it states, “Enterprises should … not render – and they should not 
be solicited or expected to render – any bribe or other improper benefit, direct or indirect, to 
any public servant or holder of public office” (ibid).
35. Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A Lacey & Jutta Birmele, “The 1998 OECD 
Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes toward Corruption in 
Business Transactions” (2000) 37:3 Am Bus LJ 485 at 496.
36. Ibid.
37. OECD, Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Bribery in International Business 
Transactions, 33 ILM 1389 (27 May 1994) [1994 Recommendation]. See also Pieth, 
“International Cooperation to Combat Corruption,” supra note 32 at 122-23.
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and Multinational Enterprises (“CIME”) to review it and its implementation 
within three years.38 
As part of the review process, the OECD consulted with business and NGOs 
to obtain their input regarding the implementation of the 1994 Recommendation.39 
When developing and negotiating the draft OECD Convention text, OECD 
delegations also consulted with members of the business community that had 
played such a significant role in putting anti-corruption on the international 
agenda. For example, the OECD’s standing advisory body, the Business and 
Industry Advisory Committee (“BIAC”), consulted closely with the OECD 
delegations during the negotiation of the OECD Convention.40 The OECD has 
officially recognized BIAC since its founding in 1962 as the voice of the business 
community in OECD Member states. This is not to say, however, that members 
of BIAC were always unequivocal on all anti-corruption issues. For example, 
members of BIAC were divided with respect to the appropriate scope of the 
OECD Convention including with respect to, among other things, whether it 
should apply to state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) (through the definition of a 
“foreign country”), or contributions to candidates for political office and political 
parties (through the definition of a “public official”).
Other international business organizations were also consulted by the 
OECD, such as the ICC, a business association whose mandate includes the 
promotion of an open international trade and investment system. Notably, the 
ICC was an early proponent of an international anti-corruption treaty. Its efforts 
began in 1975, when it established a committee chaired by Lord Shawcross.41 
The 1977 Shawcross Report recommended that the United Nations (“UN”) 
draw up an international anti-bribery treaty and called for businesses to impose 
38. 1994 Recommendation, supra note 37, art IX.
39. OECD, OECD Actions to Fight Corruption (Note by the Secretary-General) (Paris: 
OECD, 1997) at 2.
40. Letter from M Pieth to HK van Egmond (29 September 1997) [on file with authors]. See 
also OECD, Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD 
Actions to Fight Corruption: Review of the 1994 Recommendation on Bribery in International 
Business Transactions, Including Proposals to Facilitate the Criminalisation of Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials (Paris: OECD, 1997) at 10 [OECD, Review of the 1994 Recommendation].
41. Hartley William Shawcross was a former Attorney General of Great Britain and prosecutor at 
the Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 
held between 20 November 1945 and 1 October 1946. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
“Hartley William Shawcross, Baron Shawcross of Friston” (31 December 2003), online: 
<www.britannica.com/biography/Hartley-William-Shawcross-Baron-Shawcross-of-Friston>.
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some form of self-regulation.42 However, the proposed UN convention failed to 
gather enough support, and in the 1990s, the ICC shifted its attention to the 
OECD, perceiving it as a more effective forum within which such a treaty could 
be negotiated.43
B. THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
1. DEVELOPING A BINDING CONVENTION
Although CIME was originally expected to report to the Council in May 1997,44 
before the Council Meeting convened, France and Germany argued that the only 
way to ensure fairness among all Members was to negotiate a binding convention. 
Moreover, they asserted that a convention was required because each country’s 
legal system was different.45 Both the United States and TI opposed this position 
reportedly because they feared that negotiating a binding convention would take 
years and therefore delay international action.46 
The parties reached a compromise by combining the convention proposal 
with a collective pledge to legislate within a specified time period.47 The 1997 
Revised Recommendation therefore engaged two parallel strategies: (1) It called 
on Members to adopt national laws criminalizing the bribery of foreign 
public officials by the end of 1998 and (2) it committed the Council to open 
negotiations immediately to conclude an international convention to criminalize 
bribery by the end of 1997 in order for the convention to enter into force by 
the end of 1998.48 
42. International Chamber of Commerce, Commission on Ethical Practices, Recommendations 
to Combat Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, 17 ILM 417 (29 
November 1977) at 418. 
43. Fritz Heimann & Mathias Hirsch, “How International Business Combats Extortion and 
Bribery: Anti-corruption Efforts by the International Chamber of Commerce,” in OECD, 
No Longer Business as Usual: Fighting Bribery and Corruption (Paris: OECD, 2000) at 170-71.
44. Pieth, “International Cooperation to Combat Corruption,” supra note 32 at 125.
45. Paul Blustein, “Fight Looms Over Foreign Bribery,” The Washington Post (9 
May 1997), online: <www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/05/09/
fight-looms-over-foreign-bribery/3ea22baa-631c-4263-8695-9aec56c6c3b8>.
46. Paul Blustein, “Pact to Bar Bribery is Reached,” The Washington Post (24 May 1997), online: 
<www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1997/05/24/pact-to-bar-bribery-is-reached/
b1817181-a12b-4183-b508-0ea40d19c2a1>. 
47. Ibid. 
48. 1997 Revised Recommendation, supra note 22, art III.
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2. FOCUS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF BRIBERY TRANSACTIONS
One of the reasons that the OECD Convention is such a significant instrument in 
the fight against corruption is because of its focus on the supply side of international 
bribery. By making the potential cost of engaging in bribery greater than its 
benefits, the OECD Convention targets private companies in capital-exporting 
OECD countries, seeking to cut off the flow of international bribery at its source. 
As a result of the OECD Convention, all thirty-four OECD Member states and 
six additional signatories now prohibit bribery of foreign officials.
The OECD Convention binds the home countries of the vast majority 
of international businesses, making it an important consideration for many 
multinational corporations. The fact remains that even today—despite the 
emergence of global corporations from China, Russia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and many other countries—the overwhelming majority of multinational 
corporations are domiciled in OECD countries and therefore are subject to the 
foreign corruption laws introduced as a result of the OECD Convention.
3. CONTENT AND SCOPE OF THE OECD CONVENTION
The OECD Convention is short and focused, with one central obligation: Article 1 
requires State parties to introduce strict measures to criminalize the bribery of 
foreign officials.49 The OECD Convention also addresses ancillary matters such as 
jurisdiction,50 penalties,51 enforcement cooperation,52 and peer review.53
Despite its reach, the OECD Convention does not have the broader scope 
and coverage of later conventions, such as the UNCAC. Most notably, it does 
not address so-called passive bribery and the systemic or institutional challenges 
faced by countries where public officials solicit bribes54 (of course, the distinction 
between “active” and “passive” bribery is somewhat misleading since bribe 
recipients are rarely passive and play an active role in soliciting or extorting bribes 
and incentivizing corrupt practices).
49. Supra note 1, art 1.
50. Ibid, art 4.
51. Ibid, art 3.
52. Ibid, arts 5, 9, 10.
53. Ibid, art 12.
54. OECD, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (Paris: OECD, 1997) at 14, online: <www.oecd.org/daf/
anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf>.
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4. IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE, AND PEER REVIEW
To implement their obligations under the OECD Convention, states must make 
legislative changes (for example, by introducing the offence of bribing a foreign 
public official into domestic criminal law) and follow those changes up through 
law enforcement activity. On both fronts, the record of compliance with the 
OECD Convention by Member states is mixed; however, it is steadily improving, 
in part as a result of the OECD Convention’s peer-review process. The peer-review 
process consists of three phases. In the first phase, peer country reviewers consider 
the target country’s legislation. In the second phase, the reviewers examine 
whether the legislation that exists is effectively applied. In the third phase, the 
reviewers focus on enforcement efforts and any outstanding recommendations. 
Discussions about the scope and focus of a fourth phase of review took place 
recently,55 and this further stage of review may commence in late 2015. 
The intention of a peer-review process is to encourage countries to “name and 
shame” each other, raising the bar of what constitutes adequate implementation. 
Peer-review processes and the scrutiny of anti-corruption NGOs, which use 
independent metrics to monitor performance, shine a spotlight on the progress 
or lack thereof by countries in the fight against bribery. The result has been the 
increasingly vigorous implementation and enforcement of foreign bribery laws 
not only by the United States but also by Germany, Korea, Italy, Japan, France, 
Norway, Switzerland, the UK, Belgium, and Canada.
For example, after the OECD Working Group expressed concern about the 
United Kingdom’s existing legislative framework,56 the United Kingdom stated 
its intention to reform its laws57 and ultimately introduced the Bribery Act,58 one 
of the most comprehensive anti-bribery laws in the world. Similarly in Canada, 
55. OECD, “Public Consultation on Phase 4 monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention” (2015), online: <www.oecd.org/corruption/2014-call-for-comment-phase-4-
anti-bribery-convention.htm>. The public consultation was launched on 5 November 2014 
and ended on 1 December 2014 (ibid).
56. OECD, United Kingdom: Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 
Recommendation (Paris: OECD, 1999) at 24-25, online: <www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
anti-briberyconvention/2754266.pdf>. 
57. OECD, United Kingdom: Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 
Recommendation: Phase I Bis Report (Paris: OECD, 2003) at 1, 16-17, online: <www.oecd.
org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/2498215.pdf>. 
58. Bribery Act 2010 (UK), c 23.
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criticism of the government’s lax enforcement59 prompted both the continued 
acceleration of enforcement efforts and legislative amendments to implement the 
Working Group’s key recommendations.60 Because of the supply-side focus of the 
OECD Convention obligations, companies and individuals who offered or paid 
bribes are the focus of enforcement efforts by OECD Member states. Since the 
OECD Convention entered into force, 427 foreign bribery enforcement actions 
have been undertaken globally.61 Although the peak of enforcement occurred in 
2011, when seventy-eight cases were concluded, the OECD Foreign Bribery Report 
also discloses that foreign bribery cases are taking longer to prosecute (increasing 
in length from an average of two years between the accused’s last criminal 
act and the sanction in 1999 to an average of 7.3 years in 2013). The OECD 
Foreign Bribery Report speculates that a number of factors may be responsible 
for this trend, including the complexity of investigations and the willingness of 
individuals or entities accused to resist or to settle the charges against them.62
59. See OECD, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Canada 
(Paris: OECD, 2011) at 6, 59-60, online: <www.oecd.org/canada/Canadaphase3reportEN.
pdf> [OECD, Phase 3 Report]; OECD, News Release, “Canada’s enforcement of the foreign 
bribery offence still lagging; must urgently boost efforts to prosecute” (28 March 2011), 
online: <www.oecd.org/newsroom/canadasenforcementoftheforeignbriberyoffencestill 
laggingmusturgentlyboosteffortstoprosecute.htm>. 
60. Global Affairs Canada, News Release, “Strengthening Canada’s Fight Against 
Foreign Bribery” (5 February 2013), online: <www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/
news-communiques/2013/02/05b.aspx?lang=eng> [Global Affairs Canada, “Strengthening 
Canada’s Fight”]. 
61. OECD, OECD Foreign Bribery Report: An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials (Paris: OECD, 2014) at 11, online: <www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/
download/2814011e.pdf?expires=1459014725&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=DD9
E181BC5E9D17A8D1221A46FDFEDEB> [OECD, OECD Foreign Bribery Report]. The 
OECD Foreign Bribery Report analyzes case information from all countries that have enacted 
the offence of bribery of foreign public officials in their domestic criminal law.
62. Ibid at 13-14.
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In Canada, as discussed in greater detail in Part III, below, corporate fines 
of 9.5 million Canadian dollars (“CAD”)63 and 10.35 million CAD64 have been 
imposed in two cases since 2011. In 2013, the first individual was tried and 
convicted of conspiring to offer a bribe65 and was sentenced to three years of 
imprisonment.66 In total, monetary sanctions totalling 5.4 billion US dollars 
(“USD”) have been imposed in countries with a foreign bribery offence.67 These 
fines, together with the reputational damage of being convicted of criminal 
bribery, have resulted in a significant shift in corporate attitudes. Of the cases 
analyzed in the OECD Foreign Bribery Report, 31 per cent were brought to the 
attention of law enforcement authorities through corporations’ self-reporting.68 
Moreover, many multinational corporations have adopted strict anti-corruption 
compliance policies and other internal controls at substantial expense. Of the 137 
cases brought to law enforcement through self-reporting, companies detected the 
bribery through internal audits in 31 per cent of cases or due diligence in mergers 
and acquisitions (“M&A”) transactions in 28 per cent of cases.69 Given that both 
internal audits and M&A due diligence can be complex and resource-intensive, 
these statistics indicate that companies are willing to devote time and resources 
to detecting and avoiding anti-corruption liability. The OECD Convention’s focus 
on the supply side of bribery transactions aims to incentivize this kind of change. 
63. See R v Niko Resources Ltd (2011), 101 WCB (2d) 118, [2012] AWLD 4536 (QB) [Niko]. 
Niko Resources pled guilty for bribing a foreign public official in Bangladesh (ibid at para 
1). Through its subsidiary, Niko Bangladesh, the company provided the use of a vehicle and 
paid travel and accommodation expenses for the then State Minister for Energy and Mineral 
Resources to attend an oil and gas industry exhibition in Calgary (see points 4-5 in ibid at 
para 21). The use of the vehicle was valued at approximately 191,000 CAD and the trip 
cost 5,000 CAD (ibid). Niko was fined 9.5 million CAD (including a 15 per cent victim 
surcharge) (ibid at para 21). 
64. See R v Griffiths Energy International, [2013] AJ No 412 (QL) at para 10 (QB) [Griffiths]. 
Griffiths Energy entered a guilty plea on one count of bribery contrary to the CFPOA and 
was fined 9 million dollars plus a 15 per cent victim surcharge for a total penalty of $10.35 
million (ibid at para 10). Griffiths Energy admitted to having paid a 2 million dollar success 
fee to a company controlled by the wife of the ambassador to Canada of the Republic 
of Chad in connection with securing an oil and gas concession in the African country 
(ibid at para 7).
65. R v Karigar, 2013 ONSC 5199 at para 42, 108 WCB (2d) 210 [Karigar, Trial Decision].
66. R v Karigar, 2014 ONSC 3093 at para 37, 113 WCB (2d) 373 [Karigar, 
Sentencing Decision].
67. OECD, OECD Foreign Bribery Report, supra note 61 at 18.
68. Ibid at 15-16.
69. Ibid at 16-17.
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II. CANADA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS
C. THE CFPOA
While all OECD Member countries have adopted laws to implement the OECD 
Convention, several have yet to enforce those laws in a serious way. For several 
years after its ratification of the OECD Convention, Canada was a case in point. 
In 1998, Canada passed the CFPOA, thus implementing its obligation under the 
OECD Convention to create a foreign bribery offence at domestic law. However, 
Canada did not commit any resources to the enforcement of the CFPOA at the 
time of its enactment nor did it identify any particular agency as having primary 
responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of CFPOA offences. 
The CFPOA is a criminal statute that prohibits the offering, promising, 
or giving of anything of value to a foreign public official, whether directly or 
indirectly, in exchange for using the foreign public official’s position or influence 
to obtain a business advantage. In the original CFPOA, “business” was specified 
to be “any business, profession, trade, calling, manufacture or undertaking of any 
kind carried on in Canada or elsewhere for profit.”70 When the legislation entered 
into force in February 1999, the offence was punishable by up to five years of 
imprisonment or a fine in the court’s discretion.71
Originally, Canada’s jurisdiction over foreign bribery offences was territorial 
in scope: In order for Canada to have jurisdiction over an alleged offence, a 
court had to find that the offence had a “real and substantial link” with Canada, 
pursuant to the test for jurisdiction under Canadian common law (established 
in Libman).72 In R v Karigar, the only existing jurisprudence on the application 
of territorial jurisdiction to the bribery of a foreign public official, the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice concluded that Canada could assert territorial 
jurisdiction over a bribery offence where few elements of the offence occurred 
in Canada. In rejecting the defendant’s argument that the court lacked territorial 
70. CFPOA, supra note 5, s 2 [emphasis added]. The definition of “business” was later amended, 
removing “for profit.” See Fighting Foreign Corruption Act, SC 2013, c 26, s 2(3), amending 
CFPOA, supra note 5, s 2. 
71. Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, “Corruption of Foreign Public Officials: 
Guideline of the Director Issued Under Section 3(3)(c) of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
Act” in Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook (Ottawa: PPSC, 2014) at 2, online: 
<www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/d-g-eng.pdf> [PPSC, “Corruption of 
Foreign Public Officials”]. 
72. Libman, supra note 14 at 213. 
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jurisdiction73 because Libman requires “the bulk of the elements of the offence”74 
to have occurred in Canada, Justice Hackland held that “[t]he substantial 
connection test is not limited to the essential elements of the offence as submitted 
by the accused.”75 Moreover, Justice Hackland noted that in the specific context 
of a bribery offence, “one cannot segregate or otherwise deal with the bribery 
as a separate and discrete issue thereby excluding the legitimate aspects of the 
transaction from consideration in applying the substantial connection test.”76
1. ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENCE
To obtain a conviction under the CFPOA for the offence of bribing a foreign 
public official, the prosecution must prove both the actus reus (the prohibited act) 
and mens rea (a guilty mind). With respect to the proof of mens rea in this context, 
there is no requirement to prove a specific corrupt intent. It is sufficient for the 
prosecution to prove that the accused, having reason to know or suspect that a 
third party might make or offer a bribe on its behalf, failed to make appropriate 
further inquiries or to take remedial action (i.e., the doctrine of willful blindness). 
The prosecution must also establish the following elements of the actus reus:
Every person …, in order to obtain or retain an advantage in the course of business, 
directly or indirectly gives, offers or agrees to give or offer a loan, reward, advantage 
or benefit of any kind to a foreign public official or to any person for the benefit of 
a foreign public official
(a)  as consideration for an act or omission by the official in connection with the … 
official’s duties or functions; or
(b)  to induce the official to use his or her position to influence any acts or decisions 
of the [government] … for which the official performs duties or functions.77
As noted above, when first introduced, the actus reus of the offence as defined 
in the CFPOA required that the bribe be offered or paid to obtain an advantage 
in the course of business “for profit.”78 
The offence contemplates an exchange, or quid pro quo, between the person 
making the bribe and the official such that the benefit is given or offered to 
73. A pretrial motion ruling directed that this argument would be dealt with as a substantive 
defence and heard at the close of the Crown’s case. See R v Karigar, 2012 ONSC 2730 at 
para 11, [2012] OJ No 6531 (QL).
74. Karigar, Trial Decision, supra note 65 at para 37.
75. Ibid at para 39.
76. Ibid at para 39.
77. CFPOA, supra note 5, s 3(1).
78. Ibid, s 2. See also Fighting Foreign Corruption Act, supra note 70, s 2(3).
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the official in order to induce the official to use his or her official position to 
the business advantage of the person making the bribe. In Karigar, the court 
concluded that the use of the verb “agree” in the phrase “agrees to give or offer” 
imports the concept of conspiracy into the CFPOA, such that an agreement 
by persons to give or offer a bribe to a foreign public official is a violation of 
the CFPOA whether or not there is proof that the public official was offered 
or received the bribe.79 In the Karigar decision, Justice Hackland specifically 
observed that interpreting the legislation this way meets Canada’s obligations 
under the OECD Convention.80
2. FACILITATION PAYMENTS
The Canadian legislation also included an exception for “facilitation payments.” 
The exception exempts a payment “made to expedite or secure the performance 
by a foreign public official of any act of a routine nature that is part of the foreign 
public official’s duties or functions” by deeming that such payment does not 
amount to a “loan, reward, advantage or benefit” paid to obtain “an advantage in 
the course of business” such as to trigger the commission of the bribery offence.81 
Although the CFPOA does not define “acts of a routine nature,” it includes an 
illustrative list of examples:
(a) the issuance of a permit, licence or other document to qualify a person to do 
business; (b) the processing of official documents, such as visas and work permits; 
(c) the provision of services normally offered to the public, such as mail pick-up 
and delivery, telecommunication services and power and water supply; and (d) the 
provision of services normally provided as required, such as police protection, loading 
and unloading of cargo, the protection of perishable products or commodities from 
deterioration or the scheduling of inspections related to contract performance or 
transit of goods.82
The CFPOA further specifies that a decision to award new business, to 
continue existing business, or to encourage another person to make such a 
decision are not considered acts of a routine nature and therefore cannot fall 
under the exception for facilitation payments.83 
79. Karigar, Trial Decision, supra note 65 at para 28.
80. Ibid.
81. CFPOA, supra note 5, s 3(4).
82. Ibid, ss 3(4)(a)-(d).
83. Ibid, s 3(5).
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D. JUNE 2013 AMENDMENTS TO THE CFPOA
Although the enactment of the CFPOA was a welcome milestone in Canada’s 
implementation of its obligations under the OECD Convention, the legislation 
was subject to criticism, both through the peer-review process and in other fora. 
The OECD’s 2004 Phase 2 Report on Canada’s implementation of its obligations 
under the OECD Convention identified a number of perceived legislative 
deficiencies, including the continued exception for facilitation payments, the 
“for profit” requirement in the definition of “business,” and most importantly, 
the lack of nationality-based jurisdiction.84 In 2009, the government had 
introduced Bill C-31,85 which, if passed, would have amended the CFPOA to 
permit nationality-based jurisdiction. However, the bill died in the committee 
stage when Parliament was prorogued in December 2009.
In the winter of 2011–2012, the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (“DFAIT”), as it was then called, undertook a broad 
consultation regarding the CFPOA. The consultation involved corporate, legal, 
and NGO representatives from various sectors, and it resulted in the introduction 
of significant amendments to the CFPOA in 2013 relating to: (1) nationality 
jurisdiction, (2) clarification of the definition of “business” for the purposes 
of bribery, (3) elimination of facilitation payments, and (4) the establishment 
of a books and records offence. The amendments also increased the maximum 
penalty on a guilty plea or conviction for individuals (from five to fourteen years 
of imprisonment) and conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (“RCMP”) for investigation and charges under the CFPOA (the 
latter change is discussed in greater detail in Part III, below).
3. NATIONALITY-BASED JURISDICTION
Canada’s lack of nationality jurisdiction for foreign bribery offences was a 
significant area of concern with respect to its implementation of the OECD 
Convention. In its Phase 2 Follow-Up Report in 2006, the Working Group noted 
that “Canada is the only Party to the Convention which has still not established 
84. OECD, Canada: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on 
Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions (Paris: OECD, 2004) at 39, online: 
<www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/31643002.pdf>.
85. Bill C-31, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act 
and the Identification of Criminals Act and to make a consequential amendment to another 
Act, 2nd Sess, 40th Parl, 2009 (referred to Committee in the House of Commons on 27 
November 2009).
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nationality jurisdiction for the foreign bribery offence.”86 Canada’s response was 
that the OECD Convention did not mandate the creation of nationality-based 
jurisdiction; Article 4 of the OECD Convention simply requires that Parties 
review whether their current basis for jurisdiction is effective to fight foreign 
bribery.87 Canada took the position that the “real and substantial connection” 
test established in Libman has permitted Canada to extend its territorial criminal 
jurisdiction where circumstances warrant, and that in the one foreign bribery 
case concluded at the time, jurisdiction was not an issue.88 However, Canada 
also stated that it was monitoring this aspect of its implementation, and that “if 
there was evidence that nationality jurisdiction is necessary to implement the 
Convention effectively,” Canada would reconsider its implementation.89 
In its Phase 2 Follow-Up Report, the Working Group noted that its concern 
was based on the “much narrower” scope for territorial jurisdiction in Canada 
due to the requirement that there be “substantial” links between the elements of 
the offence and Canada.90 Furthermore, the Working Group noted that Article 
4.2 of the OECD Convention requires countries that have established nationality 
jurisdiction over other offences to apply it to the offence of foreign bribery, and 
that as Canada has nationality jurisdiction over several other offences, it should 
expand the scope of its jurisdiction in this context as well.91
Accordingly, the 2013 amendments established nationality-based jurisdiction 
for foreign bribery offences. Pursuant to the new section 5(1), Canada may 
take jurisdiction over offences committed outside of Canada where the person 
committing the offence was a Canadian citizen, permanent resident, or was 
incorporated (or otherwise formed or organized) in Canada.
4. DEFINITION OF BUSINESS
By deleting the words “for profit” from the definition of “business,” the CFPOA 
as amended prohibits the paying of a bribe to obtain an advantage in business, 
whether that business is for-profit or not-for-profit. Importantly, this expands 
86. OECD, Canada: Phase 2 Follow-Up Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2 
Recommendations on the Application of the Convention and the 1997 Recommendation 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (Paris: OECD, 2006) at 5, online: <www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
anti-briberyconvention/36984779.pdf> [OECD, Phase 2 Follow-Up Report].
87. Ibid at 21.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid at 5.
91. Ibid.
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the scope of the CFPOA to apply to the conduct of Canadian NGOs or other 
non-commercial entities.
Canada had originally resisted eliminating the “for profit” requirement; in 
its response to the OECD Working Group on Bribery, Canada indicated that 
it thought the CFPOA’s application to for-profit activity was in keeping with 
reference to “Business Transactions” or “transactions commerciales” in the title of 
the OECD Convention.92 The Working Group disagreed, noting that the OECD 
Convention does not create a distinction between transactions that are for-profit 
and not-for-profit.93
5. ELIMINATION OF FACILITATION PAYMENTS EXCEPTION
The treatment of facilitation payments was an issue for several Parties to the 
OECD Convention. Nonetheless, in its Phase 3 Report the OECD Working 
Group concluded that Canada was failing to implement the (post-OECD 
Convention) recommendation94 that Member countries periodically review their 
policies on and approach to facilitation payments.95 The 2009 Recommendation 
further recommended that Member countries “encourage companies to prohibit 
or discourage the use of small facilitation payments in internal company controls, 
ethics and compliance programmes or measures … .”96
The June 2013 amendments eliminate the CFPOA’s exception for facilitation 
payments. Canada’s response to the Phase 3 Report indicates that this amendment 
is a result of Canada’s completion of a review of its policies on and approaches to 
the issue of small facilitation payments.97 However, this change will only come 
into force at a future date to be determined by the federal Cabinet, in order to 
give Canadian companies and individuals time to bring their internal controls 
and practices into compliance with the “zero tolerance” approach of the revised 
CFPOA.98 At time of writing, no date for the entry into force of this amendment 
has been announced.
92. Ibid at 20.
93. Ibid at 4.
94. OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transaction (Paris: OECD, 2009), online: <www.oecd.org/
daf/anti-bribery/44176910.pdf> [OECD, 2009 Recommendation]. 
95. OECD, Phase 3 Report, supra note 59 at 16. 
96. OECD, 2009 Recommendation, supra note 94, art VI(ii).
97. OECD, Canada: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations (Paris: OECD, 2013) 
at 12-13, online: <www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/CanadaP3writtenfollowupreportEN.pdf> 
[OECD, Follow-Up to Phase 3].
98. Ibid.
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6. BOOKS AND RECORDS OFFENCE
The 2013 amendments created a new and separate “books and records” offence, 
which criminalizes the creation or maintenance of secret, incomplete, or inaccurate 
books and records for the purpose of engaging in or hiding the bribery of foreign 
public officials. Under section 4 of the CFPOA, it is now an offence to keep 
secret accounts, falsely record, not record, or inadequately identify transactions, 
enter liabilities with incorrect identification of their object, use false documents, 
or destroy accounting books and records earlier than permitted by law, for the 
purpose of concealing bribery of a public official.99 As a result, CFPOA liability 
can now flow from conduct relating to the financial records of a corporation 
made after an alleged corruption offence.
The introduction of this offence was intended to implement Article 8 of 
the OECD Convention, which requires that each State Party “provide effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal penalties” for 
omissions and falsifications of “the books, records, accounts and financial 
statements of such companies” that are done “for the purpose of bribing foreign 
public officials or of hiding such bribery.”100 Although Canada maintained its 
position that the Criminal Code contains several provisions that are relevant 
to the Article 8 obligation, it reported that the amendments to the CFPOA 
supplemented the Criminal Code provisions and provided law enforcement with 
additional tools.101
The new books and records offence is potentially the most important recent 
Canadian development in promoting compliance. For the first time, senior 
corporate officials can incur liability under the CFPOA for their conduct after 
a corrupt incident if they participate in or turn a blind eye to a cover-up of 
past misconduct.
E. DEBARMENT AND NON-CRIMINAL LAW MECHANISM
Canada also uses alternative administrative measures to promote compliance with 
anti-corruption laws through its provision of services to Canadian companies 
operating abroad and through public procurement policies. Since 2004, Export 
Development Canada (“EDC”) has had a policy of debarring companies from 
EDC support until the EDC considers that the company has taken appropriate 
99. CFPOA, supra note 5, s 4.
100. OECD Convention, supra note 1, art 8.
101. OECD, Follow-Up to Phase 3, supra note 97 at 10.
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measures to deter further bribery.102 Since late 2012, the department of Public 
Works and Government Services (“PWGSC”) (which administers procurement 
for the federal government) automatically disqualifies companies convicted of an 
offence under the CFPOA from federal government contracts.103 In the spring 
of 2014, the PWGSC extended this policy to companies convicted of bribery 
offences in foreign jurisdictions and under foreign laws.104 In 2015, the 
federal government introduced a new government-wide integrity regime for 
its procurement and real property transactions which responded to many of 
these criticisms.105 
After these developments, Canada’s debarment regime came under some 
criticism for its broad scope, perceived inflexibility, and absence of sufficient 
due process mechanisms, among other things.106 In its 2015 Budget, the federal 
government committed to introducing a new government-wide integrity regime 
for its procurement and real property transactions, and this further stage of 
review is scheduled to commence in 2016.107
102. Export Development Canada, “EDC’s Anti-Corruption Policy Guidelines,” online: <www.
edc.ca/EN/About-Us/Corporate-Social-Responsibility/Documents/anti-corruption-
guidelines.pdf>. 
103. Global Affairs Canada, Fourteenth Annual Report to Parliament: Implementation of the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, and the Enforcement of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act 
(7 November 2013), online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/corr-14.aspx?lang=eng> [Global Affairs Canada, 
Fourteenth Annual Report]. See also Public Works and Government Services Canada, 
“Ineligibility and Suspension Policy” (3 July 2015), online: <www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/
politique-policy-eng.html>. 
104. Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Backgrounder on the new 
government-wide integrity regime” (3 July 2015), online: <www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/
synopsis-backgrounder-eng.html>. 
105. James Munson, “Ottawa makes anti-corruption waivers a condition of Trade Commissioner 
Service,” iPolitics.ca (9 December 2014), online: <newcanadianmedia.ca/item/21941>. 
106. Barrie McKenna, “Ottawa working to modify strict anti-corruption rules,” The Globe 
and Mail (27 January 2015), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/
ottawa-working-to-modify-strict-anti-corruption-rules/article22661799>.
107. Government of Canada, “Chapter 5.1 – Balancing the Budget and Reducing the Debt 
Burden” (21 April 2015), online: <www.budget.gc.ca/2015/docs/plan/ch5-1-eng.
html#Improving_the_Integrity_of_Federal_Procurement>.
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III. CANADA’S ENFORCEMENT RECORD TO DATE
As noted above, despite the entry into force of the CFPOA in February 1999,108 
there was no dedicated enforcement agency for most of the first decade of the 
CFPOA’s existence.109 The CFPOA was originally drafted so that every police officer 
in the country (federal, provincial, or municipal) was empowered to investigate 
and lay charges pursuant to its provisions. Further, an entry-level prosecutor 
(federal or provincial) could prosecute the charges it created. This approach was 
fundamentally ineffective. By putting everyone in charge, it effectively left no 
one in charge. The result was that there was little real enforcement of Canada’s 
international corruption law for the first decade of the CFPOA’s existence and 
scant attention was paid to the CFPOA by Canadian companies. Canada’s lack of 
enforcement contrasted starkly with US FCPA enforcement through the 1990s 
and the dramatic upswing in convictions in the 2000s,110 culminating in the 
record fine paid by Siemens in 2008 (eight hundred million USD).111
The situation changed in Canada in late 2007 and 2008. Following repeated 
criticism in the OECD peer-review process and TI’s annual reviews, as well as 
Canada’s ratification of the UNCAC in October 2007, the Canadian government 
established a dedicated International Anti-Corruption Team (“IACT”) within 
the RCMP’s Commercial Crime Branch.112 The IACT consisted of two 
seven-person teams based in Ottawa (the nation’s capital and the location of 
the centre of Canadian federal government as well as foreign embassies) and 
108. CFPOA, supra note 5, s 13. 
109. In 2008, the RCMP established the International Anti-Corruption Unit, which was 
dedicated to the enforcement of the CFPOA. See Global Affairs Canada, “Strengthening 
Canada’s Fight,” supra note 60. 
110. Shearman & Sterling LLP, “Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement” (March 
2006) at 2, online: <www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2006/03/
Recent-Trends-and-Patterns-in-FCPA-Enforcement/Files/View-Full-Text/FileAttachment/
LIT_032706.pdf>. 
111. US Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release, 2008-294, “SEC Charges Siemens 
AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery” (15 December 2008), online: <www.sec.gov/news/
press/2008/2008-294.htm>. The 800 million USD refers to fines paid to US authorities only 
(ibid). Siemens also paid 854 million USD to German authorities (ibid). See also Jeffrey J 
Meagher & Matthew J Fader, “Siemens Pays Record $800 Million to Settle Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Charges” (23 December 2008), online: <www.klgates.com/siemens-pays-record-
800-million-to-settle-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-charges-12-23-2008>. 
112. Fritz Heimann & Gillian Dell, Progress Report 2008: Enforcement of the OECD Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(Berlin: Transparency International, 24 June 2008) at 18, online: <archive.transparency.org/
regional_pages/americas/conventions/report_card>.
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Calgary (the centre of Canada’s extractive industries and the corporate home of 
many companies operating in high-risk jurisdictions). Its purpose was to focus 
on detecting, investigating, and preventing international corruption (including 
bribery, embezzlement, and laundering of the proceeds of crime), particularly in 
the public sector. The two teams were coordinated and overseen by a dedicated 
senior RCMP officer—the Officer in Charge of Sensitive Investigation and 
International Corruption—a position established by the RCMP in 2005.113
The result was a predictable rise in Canadian enforcement activity. The latest 
report to Parliament on Canada’s implementation of the OECD Convention, 
tabled in February 2016, disclosed that the RCMP had twelve active CFPOA 
investigations underway.114 This compares to twenty-seven investigations in 
October 2014,115 and thirty-six active investigations at the time of the previous 
report to Parliament in November 2013.116 While the 2016 report indicates 
a decrease in active investigations, it is unclear whether this reflects an overall 
decrease in enforcement resources dedicated to anti-corruption matters, or 
a focus on fewer, larger and more complex investigations. Given that the 
Canadian economy is one-tenth the size, these figures compare favourably with 
the United States, where the number of active investigations is believed to be 
between 83 and 150.117
Both federal and provincial Crown prosecutors can prosecute CFPOA 
offences. However, since mid-2012, the RCMP appears to have taken a policy 
decision to refer CFPOA matters exclusively to the Public Prosecution Service of 
Canada (“PPSC”), which represents the federal Crown in criminal prosecutions. 
The PPSC has designated senior counsel to coordinate CFPOA matters and in 
113. Ibid at 4. 
114. Global Affairs Canada, Sixteenth Annual Report to Parliament: Implementation of the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, and the Enforcement of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (4 
February 2016), online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
topics-domaines/other-autre/corr-16.aspx?lang=eng> [Global Affairs Canada, Sixteenth 
Annual Report].
115. Global Affairs Canada, Fifteenth Annual Report to Parliament: Implementation of the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, and the Enforcement of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act  
(3 October 2014), online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
topics-domaines/other-autre/corr-15.aspx?lang=eng> [Global Affairs Canada, Fifteenth 
Annual Report]. 
116. Global Affairs Canada, Fourteenth Annual Report, supra note 103. 
117. Richard L Cassin, “The Corporate Investigations List (April 2016)” (5 April 2016), 
The FCPA Blog (blog), online:<http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/4/5/
the-corporate-investigations-list-april-2016.html>.  
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March 2014 issued a guideline that emphasized the importance of coordinating 
the prosecution of CFPOA offences at a national level.118 
In addition, over the same time period, two parallel trends converged to make 
anti-corruption an important priority for the Canadian corporate community. 
First, the fact that many of Canada’s largest companies are cross-listed on US 
stock exchanges made them subject to the FCPA. Increasing enforcement in the 
United States prompted US-listed Canadian companies to implement greater 
compliance measures. Second, US purchasers’ and lenders’ potential FCPA 
exposure led to more robust due diligence in acquisitions of Canadian companies 
and in corporate finance involving US lenders. The next section presents an 
overview of key milestones in Canada’s enforcement record to date.
A. THE EARLY YEARS: HYDRO-KLEEN
As noted above, there was little active enforcement of the CFPOA during the 
first decade of its existence. The first case concluded in Canada involved illegal 
payments of 28,299.88 CAD by Hydro Kleen Systems Inc. (“Hydro Kleen”) to 
a US immigration official working at the Calgary International Airport.119 In 
return for these payments, the official advised Hydro Kleen’s employees on how 
to use work visas to obtain entry into the United States.120 Unbeknownst to the 
company, the official also obstructed the entry of Hydro Kleen’s competitors’ 
personnel into the United States.121
The bribery scheme came to light due to complaints from a competitor 
whose personnel were turned back at the Calgary airport.122 The competitor hired 
a private investigator and turned over evidence to the RCMP, which pursued 
the investigation and ultimately laid charges of bribery against the company, 
its president, an employee, and the US official.123 The court fined Hydro 
Kleen 25,000 CAD pursuant to a negotiated plea,124 and the charges against 
the president and the employee were stayed.125 The US official was sentenced 
to six months imprisonment on each count126 and was deported to the United 
118. PPSC, “Corruption of Foreign Public Officials,” supra note 71 at 1-3.
119. R v Watts, [2005] AJ No 568 (QL) at para 20 (QB) [Hydro Kleen].
120. Ibid at paras 56-57.
121. Ibid at paras 61-64.
122. TRACE Anti-Bribery Compliance Solutions, “Trace Compendium: Hydro Kleen” (2015), 
online: <www.traceinternational2.org/compendium/view.asp?id=128>.
123. Ibid. See also Hydro Kleen, supra note 119 at paras 41, 43.
124. Ibid at para 189.
125. Ibid at paras 82, 189.
126. R v Garcia, 2002 ABPC 156 at para 32, 325 AR 85.
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States.127 This light sentence and relatively minor fine indicated how far Canada 
was from the kind of active enforcement seen in other jurisdictions, including 
the United States.
B. THE SECOND WAVE: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS IN THE 
PUBLIC EYE
Throughout the 2000s, Canada’s enforcement record remained bare, with the 
Hydro Kleen prosecution being the only case prior to 2010. However, after 
dedicated law enforcement resources were devoted to anti-corruption in 2008, 
there was a noticeable upswing in enforcement activity. For example, in 2010, 
the RCMP laid charges against Mr. Nazir Karigar under paragraph 3(1)(b) of 
the CFPOA for allegedly making a payment to an Indian government official to 
secure a multi-million dollar procurement contract for Cryptometrics, a Canadian 
high-tech firm.128 These charges resulted in Canada’s first contested trial under 
the CFPOA in 2013, as discussed below. In 2011, the RCMP executed a search 
warrant against Blackfire Exploration, a junior Calgary-based mining company, 
reportedly after receiving a complaint from mining watchdog NGOs.129 Also in 
2011, the RCMP executed search warrants at the offices of SNC-Lavalin Group 
Inc. in Oakville, Ontario in relation to its investigation into alleged corruption 
in the World Bank-funded Padma Bridge project in Bangladesh.130 However, 
notwithstanding the importance of these developments and the benefit of the 
public having an opportunity to learn of them through RCMP press releases and 
media coverage, there was little reason for most companies to suspect how high 
the stakes were about to become.
In June 2011, Niko Resources Ltd. (“Niko”), a Canadian public company 
in the oil and gas exploration sector, pleaded guilty to one count of bribery based 
on events that occurred in 2005.131 The guilty plea was entered with an agreed 
statement of facts in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, where Niko admitted 
127. OECD, Phase 2 Follow-Up Report, supra note 86 at 26.
128. Karigar, Trial Decision, supra note 65 at paras 1-2.
129. Les Whittington & Brett Popplewell, “Mining watchdogs want probe,” The Toronto Star (10 
March 2010), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2010/03/10/mining_watchdogs_
want_probe.html>. 
130. See Greg McArthur, “RCMP raid Calgary miner over bribery allegations,” The Globe 
and Mail (29 August 2011), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/
rcmp-raid-calgary-miner-over-bribery-allegations/article542841>. See also Ross Marowits, 
“SNC-Lavalin faces new bribery allegations,” Metro (15 May 2013), online: <metronews.ca/
news/canada/673053/snc-lavalin-faces-new-bribery-allegations>.
131. Niko, supra note 63 at para 1.
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to having attempted to influence the then-Bangladeshi State Minister for Energy 
and Mineral Resources by providing a vehicle for his personal use, valued at 
190,984 CAD, and paying the travel costs for him to attend an Energy Expo in 
Calgary and a subsequent personal trip to New York, valued at 5,000 CAD.132 
These benefits were allegedly paid to obtain the minister’s support in relation to 
the negotiation of a gas purchase and sale agreement with a state enterprise and 
mitigation of the fallout resulting from a gas blowout at one of Niko’s sites in 
Bangladesh.133 The RCMP learned of the potential CFPOA violations through 
reports from DFAIT.134
The Crown was unable to prove that any influence was obtained as a result 
of providing these benefits.135 Nonetheless, and notwithstanding the Crown’s 
acknowledgement of Niko’s cooperation with the RCMP investigation and guilty 
plea before charges were formally laid, Niko was sentenced to pay a significant 
fine: 8.3 million CAD plus a fifteen per cent victim surcharge, for a total penalty 
of 9.5 million CAD. In addition, Niko was subject to a significant probation 
order, which required the company to undertake audits of its compliance with 
anti-corruption laws under court supervision for three years.136 Indeed, the terms 
of the order provide a roadmap for other companies looking to understand what 
robust corporate anti-corruption compliance might look like.
Less than two years later, Canada would mark its second significant 
prosecution. In January 2013, Griffiths Energy International Inc. (“Griffiths”) 
entered a guilty plea on one count of bribery contrary to the CFPOA.137 Griffiths 
admitted to having paid a two million CAD success fee to a company controlled 
by the wife of the ambassador to Canada of the Republic of Chad in connection 
with securing an oil and gas concession in the African country.138 The Crown did 
not allege and Griffiths did not admit that any influence was actually realized as a 
result of these payments.139 Indeed, when Griffiths’s new board and management 
learned of the corrupt arrangements after a significant change in personnel at the 
132. See R v Niko Resources Ltd (2011), 101 WCB (2d) 118, [2012] AWLD 4536 (QB) (Agreed 
Statement of Facts at paras 4-5) [Niko, Agreed Statement of Facts].
133. Ibid at para 58. 
134. Ibid at para 45.
135. Ibid at para 58.
136. Niko, supra note 63 at para 21.
137. Griffiths, supra note 64 at para 5.
138. Ibid at para 7.
139. R v Griffiths Energy International, [2013] AJ No 412 (QL) (QB) (Agreed Statement of Facts 
at para 50) [Griffiths, Agreed Statement of Facts].
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top levels of the company, the new leadership undertook an internal investigation 
and shared these results with the PPSC and RCMP.140
Griffiths was fined 9 million CAD plus a 15 per cent victim surcharge 
for a total penalty of 10.35 million CAD.141 This significant fine was levied 
notwithstanding the fact that the company voluntarily disclosed the matter to the 
Canadian and US authorities when it came to the attention of new management 
and cooperated fully in the RCMP investigation.142 In fact, the court’s reasons 
suggest that the fine would have been considerably higher in the absence of the 
voluntary disclosure and Griffiths’s cooperative conduct.143
Once underway, Canadian enforcement increased rapidly. There have 
been two corporate convictions with substantial monetary penalties (Niko and 
Griffiths), one individual convicted and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment 
(Karigar), as well as the use of a variety of enforcement and investigative tools 
in addition to the search warrants mentioned above—including the use of 
anti-money laundering proceedings under the Criminal Code to seize assets 
related to corruption; a grant of immunity to a corporate official in exchange for 
providing evidence for prosecution under the CFPOA; the issuance of numerous 
Criminal Code production orders by the courts in CFPOA cases; and formal 
enforcement cooperation with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, 
US Department of Justice, UK Serious Fraud Office, Swiss Attorney General, 
and other foreign law enforcement agencies in international corruption cases, 
including repeated use of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties.
C. TESTING THE CFPOA: KARIGAR AND PENDING SNC-LAVALIN CASES
Niko and Griffiths sent strong signals to the Canadian business community 
that CFPOA enforcement was active and serious. However, because both cases 
proceeded by way of what amounts to a negotiated settlement, no legal issues 
came before the courts to test the limits and contours of the legislation. When 
the first contested cases began to work their way through the courts in 2013 
and 2014, Canadian judges started to have the opportunity to clarify significant 
principles relevant to anti-corruption law in Canada.
140. Ibid at paras 41-43.
141. See Griffiths, supra note 64.
142. Ibid at paras 15-17.
143. Griffiths, Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 139 at paras 52-56. 
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1. R V KARIGAR—TRIAL AND SENTENCING DECISIONS
In June 2013, Nazir Karigar, a Canadian citizen, was found guilty of bribery 
under the CFPOA for an agreement to pay bribes to certain officials of Air India 
and the Indian Minister of Civil Aviation with regard to the procurement of an 
airport security system. Mr. Karigar had acted as an agent for Cryptometrics 
Canada, a Canadian technology company.144 In contesting the case against him, 
Mr. Karigar argued that (1) the Crown had not adduced sufficient evidence 
to establish the actus reus of the offence because the Crown failed to present 
any evidence regarding the actual payment of sums to foreign public officials145 
and (2) that Canada can only assert territorial jurisdiction over the matter if 
there is a real and substantial connection between the essential elements of the 
offence and Canada.146
With respect to the first issue, Justice Hackland of the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice concluded that the use of the verb “agree” in the phrase “agrees to 
give or offer” in section 3(1) imports the concept of conspiracy into the CFPOA 
such that an agreement by persons to give or offer a bribe to a foreign public 
official is a violation of the Act, whether or not there is proof that the public 
official was offered or received the bribe.147 
With respect to the second issue, Justice Hackland concluded that the “real 
and substantial connection” test does not require that all of the essential elements 
of the offence have a substantial connection to Canada. Instead, Justice Hackland 
analyzed the tainted transaction as a whole, noting that it included a Canadian 
company and an agent (Mr. Karigar) who was for many years a Canadian business 
resident.148 Although the “directing minds” of the corrupt transaction were based 
in New York and the dealings with public officials occurred in India,149 at the 
relevant time, Mr. Karigar was employed by the Canadian company and the 
advantage that would have been obtained by the payment of bribes was for the 
benefit of the Canadian company. Cryptometrics Canada would have been a 
party to the contemplated procurement contract, and much of the work would 
have been done by its employees in Ottawa.150 
144. Karigar, Trial Decision, supra note 65 at para 1.
145. Ibid at paras 21-22.
146. Ibid at paras 34, 37.
147. Ibid at paras 28-29, 33.
148. Ibid at para 39-40.
149. Ibid at para 38.
150. Ibid at para 40.
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The Karigar interpretation is consistent with the earlier position taken by 
Canada with respect to its implementation of the CFPOA that the “real and 
substantial connection” test need not be interpreted so narrowly as to present a 
barrier to the effective prosecution of CFPOA offences. The finding in Karigar is 
important despite the introduction of nationality jurisdiction in 2013 since the 
“real and substantial connection” test still applies to the activities of non-Canadian 
companies and individuals for the purposes of the application of the CFPOA. 
Following the trial and subsequent guilty verdict, Mr. Karigar was sentenced 
to three years’ imprisonment in April 2014.151 In June 2014, the RCMP laid 
charges against three foreign nationals believed to have assisted in the bribery 
scheme, and Canada-wide warrants for these individuals remain outstanding.152
2. SNC-LAVALIN: INVESTIGATIONS AND FIRST CHARGES
Corruption investigations into the activities of SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. (“SNC”) 
have received a significant amount of media attention since the RCMP executed 
a search warrant at SNC premises in September 2011 in relation to the Padma 
Bridge construction project in Bangladesh.153 In addition to the Padma Bridge 
project, SNC has been under investigation in relation to public contracts in Libya 
as well as a high profile public construction project in Canada.154
In 2012, the RCMP arrested and charged two former SNC employees; 
after a preliminary inquiry in April 2013, both individuals were committed to 
stand trial, although the details of the case are subject to a publication ban.155 
That same year, the RCMP charged a former senior vice-president of SNC and 
two other individuals under the CFPOA in connection with the Padma Bridge 
151. Karigar, Sentencing Decision, supra note 66 at para 37.
152. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Press Release, “RCMP Charge Individuals with Foreign 
Corruption” (4 June 2014), online: <www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ottawa/ne-no/pr-cp/2014/0604-
corruption-eng.htm>; Global Affairs Canada, “Fifteenth Annual Report,” supra note 114.
153. Marowits, supra note 129.
154. See Graeme Hamilton, “RCMP charges SNC-Lavalin with fraud and corruption linked to 
Libyan projects,” Financial Post (19 February 2015), online: <business.financialpost.com/
news/rcmp-charges-snc-lavalin-with-fraud-and-corruption-linked-to-libyan-projects>. See 
also Tristin Hopper, “Federal agency boss took $1.5M in kickbacks from SNC-Lavalin 
contract to restore Montreal bridge, report alleges,” National Post (13 February 2014), online: 
<news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/federal-agency-boss-took-1-5m-in-kickbacks-from-
snc-lavalin-contract-to-restore-montreal-bridge-report>.
155. Global Affairs Canada, Fifteenth Annual Report, supra note 115. See also 
Marowits, supra note 1.
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investigation.156 In April 2014, the Ontario Superior Court found that Canada 
lacked adjudicative jurisdiction over one of these individuals, a Bangladeshi 
national who was not present in Canada and who lacked any citizenship or 
residency ties to Canada.157 Although Canadian courts may have jurisdiction 
over the offence, unless and until the accused is physically present in Canada, 
or Bangladesh offers to surrender him to Canada, Canadian courts do not 
have jurisdiction over his person.158 Accordingly, the prosecution against the 
Bangladeshi national has been stayed while the others continue. Prosecutions 
and investigations also continue with respect to alleged payments to third parties 
relating to public contracts in Libya; although charges have been laid, none of the 
Libya-related matters has yet proceeded to trial.159
In February 2015, the RCMP laid fraud and corruption charges against SNC, 
its division SNC-Lavalin Construction Inc., and its subsidiary SNC-Lavalin 
International Inc.160
156. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Press Release, “RCMP Charge Former SNC Lavalin 
Senior Executive” (18 September 2013), online: <www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ottawa/ne-no/
pr-cp/2013/0918-lavalin-eng.htm>. See also Global Affairs Canada, Fifteenth Annual Report, 
supra note 114. 
157. Chowdhury v Canada, 2014 ONSC 2635 at paras 6, 39, 52, 57, 309 CCC (3d) 447.
158. Ibid at para 54.
159. See Milos Barutciski, Matthew S Kronby & Sabrina A Bandali, “Canada Lays Corruption 
and Fraud Charges Against SNC-Lavalin” (19 February 2015), Bennett Jones Thought 
Network (blog), online: <blog.bennettjones.com/2015/02/19/canada-lays-corruption-
fraud-charges-snc-lavalin>. In April 2012, the RCMP executed a search warrant at SNC 
headquarters pursuant to a mutual legal assistance request by the Swiss authorities (ibid). 
The Swiss authorities had arrested a former executive vice-president of SNC for money 
laundering and corruption, and in August 2014, they reached a plea deal that saw the 
executive plead guilty in October 2014 to bribery in exchange for the twenty-nine months of 
incarceration he served and an order to repay millions of dollars to SNC (ibid). Two weeks 
later, the executive was extradited to Canada, where he is expected to face prosecution of the 
domestic corruption charges laid against him in relation to a large public construction project 
in Quebec (ibid). In February 2014, the RCMP laid charges against a former executive 
vice-president of construction and a former vice-president and financial controller in relation 
to the Libya corruption allegations (ibid). In September 2014, the RCMP laid additional 
charges against the former executive vice-president for obstructing justice and against a 
Canadian lawyer for obstructing justice and extortion, alleging that the two men sought 
to obtain a statement from the former executive vice-president detained in Switzerland in 
exchange for money (ibid). See also Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Press Release, “Charges 
Laid in Project Assistance” (10 September 2014), online: <www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ottawa/
ne-no/pr-cp/2014/0910-assistance-eng.htm>.
160. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Press Release, “RCMP Charges SNC-Lavalin” (19 February 
2015), online: <www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ottawa/ne-no/pr-cp/2015/0219-lavalin-eng.htm>.
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IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCERNS
D. THE CHALLENGE FOR CANADIAN BUSINESS
As Canadian business looks to expand in new markets in the twenty-first 
century, it is inevitable that companies will look to emerging markets. While 
offering lucrative business opportunities, many developing countries suffer 
from weak institutions and an uncertain commitment to the rule of law. This 
is particularly acute in resource-rich regions where Canadian businesses have a 
competitive advantage (e.g., mining and energy expertise). Canadian companies 
are increasingly adopting more robust anti-corruption compliance policies to 
respond to the scrutiny of international anti-corruption enforcement agencies 
and to provide some initial protection in light of their obligations under the 
CFPOA. However, this trend towards enhancing compliance mechanisms is still 
in its early stages, and companies are prone to adopting formal measures rather 
than establishing deeply-rooted compliance cultures. 
Nonetheless, the increase in enforcement levels and awareness by businesses 
and their legal and financial advisors is leading to significant changes in 
compliance and transaction practices. These changes include more exacting 
corruption-related representations and warranties, conditionality, covenants, and 
indemnities in M&A and finance agreements; increasingly detailed due diligence 
by buyers and lenders; more process-driven compliance mechanisms (reporting 
and approval requirements); tighter internal controls as companies become more 
familiar with the qualitative functions of enterprise software; and a growing 
cadre of experienced Canadian specialist professionals (lawyers, accountants, 
compliance professionals, and internal investigators).
Increasing enforcement by the RCMP prompts greater compliance efforts 
by Canadian companies. So too does the need to satisfy capital markets that 
the company business is sustainable and that potential foreign lenders, joint 
venture partners, and acquirers will not be buying a liability when they invest in a 
Canadian business. Canadian companies that are issuers in the United States are 
also subject to the jurisdiction of US anti-corruption laws and potential criminal 
and civil enforcement actions by the US Department of Justice or Securities and 
Exchange Commission, respectively. Resource transparency initiatives, such as 
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those undertaken by the United States,161 the European Union,162 and Canada,163 
also dovetail with the evolution of compliance culture, particularly in the resource 
sector. Similarly, public outrage at corruption-related scandals reported by the 
media also contributes to greater corporate sensitivity to potential corruption 
issues. However, Canadian businesses will also feel countervailing pressure as 
they expand in more challenging markets and compete more frequently with 
multinationals and SOEs from countries that do not have the same level of 
commitment to anti-corruption enforcement. Thus, the same frustrations 
that prompted the US business community to advocate for an international 
anti-corruption agreement can similarly be expected to motivate peers in other 
countries seeking to level the global playing field with respect to the supply side 
of bribery transactions.
E. LIMITATIONS OF THE OECD CONVENTION APPROACH AND FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS
As the above analysis indicates, Canada’s enforcement of the CFPOA has taken 
on significant momentum since 2008 in addressing the supply side of bribery 
transactions involving Canadian companies. However, the OECD Convention 
and the laws inspired by it are not a complete solution to the issue of bribery 
and corruption in international business. In the following section, we summarize 
some of the limitations of the OECD Convention’s approach and possible 
future directions.
First, the predominant focus on supply-side corruption is a significant 
limitation to the effectiveness of the OECD Convention. Prominent signatories 
did not view the OECD Convention as a final solution to bribery and corruption 
in international business.164 Indeed, following the adoption of the OECD 
Convention, the United States pursued demand-side initiatives, including the 
encouragement of global norms and regional and bilateral efforts.165 Members 
of the business community believed that the OECD Convention should have 
161. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111-203, 124 
Stat 1376 (2010).
162. EC, Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of 
certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, [2013] OJ, 
L182/19, art 44.
163. Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act, SC 2014, c 39. 
164. Battling International Bribery, supra note 13 at vi-vii.
165. Ibid at vii. 
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extended to “international bribery in the private sector and bribery of foreign 
officials for purposes other than to obtain or retain business.”166 Moreover, 
the composition of the international business community has significantly 
changed. When the OECD Convention came into force in 1999, there were few 
multinational corporations from outside the OECD countries. Today, leading 
multinationals from China, Russia, India, Brazil, Malaysia, Indonesia, and many 
other non-OECD countries compete vigorously in international business.
The OECD Convention’s scope is problematic. While non-OECD countries 
are beginning to adopt foreign bribery laws, the record to date is still weak 
and enforcement is virtually non-existent. As a result, one of the motivations 
for the adoption of the OECD Convention—to level the playing field between 
international companies—is under increasing pressure. 
In addition, the OECD Convention fails to resolve the practical realities 
faced by the international business community. No matter how sophisticated 
the compliance systems are, business is not conducted in situations of perfect 
control. When confronted with bribe solicitation or extortion by a corrupt 
official, business executives are faced with a sharp dilemma: resist and jeopardize 
the company’s business objectives or succumb and jeopardize the company’s (and 
the executive’s own) legal exposure. Even if the company has a robust compliance 
culture, resisting corrupt practices inevitably results in a significant diversion of 
employee time and corporate resources. Instead of doing business, employees find 
themselves spending time reporting to lawyers and compliance officers, filling out 
due diligence forms, and assisting internal investigations. In addition to the effort 
needed to maintain robust compliance, so long as the temptation to succumb 
to a bribe solicitation in order to gain a business advantage exists, determined 
individuals may succeed in circumventing internal controls, leading to both 
potential liability and further investigative and compliance costs. Fundamentally, 
companies face a continuing challenge of allocating scarce resources among 
competing priorities and have to weigh the cost, benefits, and risks they face 
when determining how robust they can afford their anti-corruption efforts to be.
This reality supports the position that there is a need to make greater efforts 
to address demand-side corruption. A striking imbalance exists between the effort 
and resources devoted to addressing supply-side and demand-side corruption. 
While OECD Members have committed substantial resources to investigating 
and prosecuting international bribery, they have devoted little to developing 
mechanisms that will assist their companies when confronted with bribe 
solicitation or extortion. Admonishing private enterprises to “just say no” and 
166. OECD, Review of the 1994 Recommendation, supra note 40 at 10.
(2015) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL266
pointing to the applicable laws is of little practical assistance. Some bodies, such 
as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, have issued practical guides 
that address demand-side issues, but these remain dependent on the willingness 
of governments to address corruption internally.167
If the international community could reach a sustained consensus to address 
the demand-side of bribery transactions as they have with supply-side corruption, 
international mechanisms could be developed to assist companies trying to 
behave ethically, furthering the gains made in the development of corporate 
compliance efforts to date. What is needed is a menu of tools that would allow 
companies confronted by corruption to obtain the international community’s 
assistance in resisting such corruption without exposing their entire investment 
in the host country to ransom. This challenge goes beyond the scope of criminal 
law. We offer the following suggestions for future examination and development.
First, international organizations such as the UN and its various agencies 
could explore the establishment of a high-level contact point for reports of bribe 
solicitation and the development of a registry of official corruption. Similar to 
the “name and shame” logic of peer-review systems used to assess legislative 
compliance with and enforcement of international anti-corruption conventions, 
such a registry could create an internationally-accessible record of historic country 
risk based on bribe solicitations themselves.
Second, countries could explore the development of collective action 
through a joint diplomatic mechanism that addresses persistent bribe 
solicitations or endemic corruption. For example, there have been discussions 
within the OECD, TI, the Business 20 summit, and other fora regarding the 
establishment of a high-level reporting mechanism that would allow companies 
faced with bribe solicitation or extortion to bring the matter to the attention 
of high levels of government through an independent channel. This proposal 
could also be extended and internationalized by enabling a multilateral forum 
to respond to such allegations. The implementation of such a mechanism would 
require a serious commitment on the part of the countries involved—at the very 
highest level—to combating corruption and to protecting companies invoking 
the procedure from retaliation. 
Third, the OECD Convention and other international agreements encourage 
states to adopt nationality-based jurisdiction over their companies’ international 
conduct. A measure of symmetry would be provided by conferring limited 
167. See e.g. UNODC, Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
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jurisdiction on the bribe payer’s country over the bribe solicitor (i.e., the corrupt 
foreign official). Although criminal jurisdiction is likely not feasible, including as 
a result of international comity and sovereign equality, there may be other forms 
of enforcement or jurisdiction that strike an appropriate balance. For example, 
civil jurisdiction backed by banking and travel sanctions could be equally effective 
if enforced multilaterally.
Finally, official corruption could be introduced as a cause of action in 
international investment treaties. This would protect businesses that are committed 
to ethical conduct by affording them a mechanism to seek redress for the loss of 
business or other harm that may result from resisting a bribe solicitation.
These measures may not be easy to develop or implement and may not 
garner an international consensus any time soon. However, there is ample 
scope for international efforts against demand-side corruption just as there was 
against supply-side corruption. Moreover, unless the demand-side is addressed, 
the achievements on the supply-side may well risk being eroded over time, to 
everyone’s detriment.
The focus on supply-side corruption has led to important results evidenced by 
the substantial resources committed to corporate compliance, training, internal 
controls, and internal investigations. Robust compliance policies and internal 
controls impose costs that go beyond the direct costs of their implementation. 
However, they also impose transaction costs indirectly through the diversion 
of management’s attention away from business decision making and through 
the delays caused by the adherence to formal compliance obligations such as 
due diligence and reporting. Companies incur these costs even where the risks 
are less significant or non-existent. At the same time, even the most robust 
compliance regimes can be circumvented if the incentives are high enough 
and the circumventers devote sufficient effort. As in all areas of public policy, 
it is important to make sure that limited resources are allocated efficiently. The 
effort devoted to fighting supply-side corruption will ultimately result in a 
misallocation of scarce resources and a reversal of its results, unless it is matched 
by an equivalent effort on the demand side.
